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This paper proposes a new methodology to test for whether indirect tax reforms are pro-poor. The 
methodology extends stochastic dominance techniques and enables identifying tax reforms that will 
necessarily be deemed absolutely or relatively pro-poor by a wide spectrum of poverty analysts. The 
statistical properties of the various estimators are also derived in order to make the method 
implementable using survey data. The methodology is used to assess the pro-poorness of possible reforms 
to Mexico’s indirect tax system. This leads to the identification of several possible pro-poor tax reforms in 
that country. 
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 Cet article propose une nouvelle méthode permettant de déterminer si une réforme de la fiscalité 
indirecte est pro-pauvre. Cette méthode adapte des techniques de dominance stochastique permettant 
ainsi d’identifier les réformes fiscales qui seront considérées absolument ou relativement pro-pauvre par 
un large éventail d’analystes de la pauvreté. Les propriétés statistiques des différents estimateurs sont 
dérivées afin de rendre la méthode applicable à des données d’enquêtes. La méthode est utilisée afin 
d’identifier plusieurs réformes de la fiscalité indirecte mexicaine qui serait pro-pauvres. 
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 1 Introduction
The last decade has seen several contributions on whether growth is “pro-
poor”. A central issue is whether the poor’s beneﬁts from growth exceed some
norm1. This norm may be absolute or relative to the changes in the entire distri-
bution of income, as recently discussed for instance in Duclos (2009). A similar
issue applies to the effect of public policy. We may wish for instance to assess
whether a ﬁscal reform is “pro-poor”, in the sense that the beneﬁts that the poor
derive from it exceed some norm. Unfortunately, as with many other distributive
assessments, the precise deﬁnition that can be given to the pro-poorness of an in-
direct tax reform is essentially a matter of normative judgement and can be open
to the criticism of being arbitrary to at least some extent. Elements of arbitrari-
ness arise inter alia in the choice of a poverty line to separate the poor from the
non-poor and in the choice of an aggregative procedure to summarize the reform’s
impact on the poor.2 To show how one can reduce these sources of arbitrariness
in understanding pro-poorness is the ﬁrst main objective of this paper.
Thesecondmainobjectiveofthepaperistoassesshowandwhethera(marginal)
tax reform can be considered to be pro-poor. Santoro (2007) categorizes the eco-
nomic literature on the impact of marginal tax reforms into three different ap-
proaches. The ﬁrst is based on Ahmad and Stern (1984) and uses a speciﬁc social
welfare function. The second identiﬁes directions for marginal tax reforms based
on classes of social welfare functions that display an aversion to inequality and
that are symmetric — this was introduced by Yitzhaki and Thirsk (1990), Yitzhaki
and Slemrod (1991) and Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1996). The third approach rec-
ognizes that marginal tax reforms can also be used as instruments for changing
poverty and is based inter alia on Makdissi and Wodon (2002), Duclos, Makdissi,
and Wodon (2008) and Liberati (2003).
This paper extends this third approach by testing for whether indirect tax re-
forms can be considered to be pro-poor. By this, it is meant that an indirect tax
reform must be deemed to be “equitable towards the poor” or “in favor of the
poor”, in the sense that the beneﬁts of the reform must accrue (in some sense to be
1See, among many recent interesting contributions to that issue, Bruno, Ravallion, and Squire
(1998), United Nations (2000), Eastwood and Lipton (2001), Ravallion (2001), Dollar and Kraay
(2002), World Bank (2002) and Bourguignon (2003).
2Different approaches have been proposed to separate the poor from the non-poor and to com-
pute indicesof “growthpro-poorness”. See, for instance, McCulloch andBaulch (1999), Ravallion
and Datt (2002), Kakwani, Khandker, and Son (2003), Ravallion and Chen (2003), Klasen (2003),
Son (2004), Essama-Nssah (2005), and Araar, Duclos, Audet, and Makdissi (2007).
2made precise later) “more” to the poor, or that its costs must hurt “less” the poor.
The remainder of the paper is divided as follows. Section 2 introduces the
notation and derives the main analytical results. Section 3 proposes estimators
andderivessamplingdistributionsforthetoolsneededtotestfortaxpro-poorness.
For the important case of ﬁrst-order pro-poorness, these estimators involve non-
parametric regressions. Section 4 applies the methodology to Mexico’s indirect
tax system using the 2004 Mexican ENIGH database. Section 5 concludes. The
Appendix (Section 6) contains proofs of the paper’s main results.
2 Notation and methodological framework
2.1 Poverty Measurement
We ﬁrst start with the presentation of rather general views of how poverty and
tax pro-poorness can be assessed. For simplicity, suppose that poverty indices are





where y is real income, z is the poverty line (in real terms), F (¢) is the cumulative
distribution function of income with support over [0;!], and p(y;z) is a function
that measures the poverty of an individual with an income y and using a poverty
line z. We suppose that p(y;z) ¸ 0 and that p(y;z) = 0 for all y > z. Duclos and
Makdissi (2003) use the properties of P (z) to deﬁne classes of poverty indices













p(y;z) 2 b Cs(z);
(¡1)
i p(i) (y;z) ¸ 0 for i = 0;1;2;:::;s,





where p(i) (y;z) represents the i-th derivative of p(y;z) with respect to y and b Cs
is the set of continuous functions that are s-times differentiable on [0;!].
For poverty indices P 2 ¦1(z), an increase in the income of any one individ-
ual will weakly reduce the poverty index. This class of indices is thus Paretian.
3The Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984) indices are an example of popular additive poverty
measures. Other examples of additive indices can be found in Watts (1968), Clark, Hemming, and
Ulph (1981) and Chakravarty (1983).
3The indices are also symmetrical since exchanging incomes between two individ-
uals will not affect poverty (by the property of the distribution function in (1)).
This type of indices can thus be said to satisfy Pen (1971)’s principles for com-
paring distributions (see Duclos, Makdissi, and Wodon (2008)).
The poverty indices included in ¦2(z) are also convex. This implies that they
respect the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfer, a principle that states that a transfer
from any one individual to a poorer individual should weakly decrease poverty. In
addition to obeying the above principles, the poverty indices that belong to ¦3(z)
must also obey the Kolm (1976) principle of transfers, which states that a Pigou-
Dalton transfer that takes place at the bottom of the distribution should have a
greater impact on poverty than one taking place higher up in the distribution.
Hence, a progressive transfer that occurs within a lower part of the distribution
will reduce poverty even if it is accompanied by a symmetric regressive transfer
higher up in the distribution. Indices of a class ¦s(z) with s greater then 3 can be
interpreted by using the generalized transfer principle proposed by Fishburn and
Willig (1984). This generalized principle states that the greater the order s, the
greater is the sensibility of an index to changes occurring in a lower part of the
distribution.
2.2 Identifying pro poor reforms
Let us now suppose that one wishes to test whether an indirect tax reform can
be considered to be pro-poor. We consider three possible scenarios through which
this can be done.
1. The government wishes to implement a marginal reduction in the tax (or
a marginal increase in the subsidy) on good i, without attempting to offset
the fall in total government revenue (possibly because the government is
running a budget surplus).
2. The government wishes to implement a marginal increase in the tax (or a
marginal decrease in the subsidy) on good i, without attempting to offset
the increase in total government revenue (possibly because the government
is running a budget deﬁcit).
3. The government wishes to implement a revenue-neutral indirect tax reform.
It must therefore ﬁnance a marginal tax reduction on good i (or a marginal
increase in its subsidy) with a marginal increase in the tax (or a marginal
decrease in the subsidy) on good j 6= i.
4Now assume that producer prices are held constant and, for expositional sim-
plicity, set them to 1 so that q = e+t, where q is the vector of current consumption
prices, e is a vector of ones, and t is the vector of indirect taxes. The impact of
a marginal change dti to the tax on a good i will impact the poverty level of an








Using Roy’s identity and setting the vector of reference prices to the current price
vector, the change in real income produced by a marginal change in the tax on
good i is given by (see for instance Besley and Kanbur 1988)
@y
@ti
= ¡xi (y;q); (4)
where xi (y;q) is the Marshallian demand of good i at the vector of current prices,




(1) (y;z)xi (y;q): (5)
We do not wish, however, to determine if a tax reform reduces or increases
poverty, but whether it can be considered pro-poor in the sense of Duclos (2009)
and Araar, Duclos, Audet, and Makdissi (2007). This requires distinguishing be-
tween relative and absolute pro-poorness. We will say that a tax reform is R-pro-
poor for relative pro-poorness and A-pro-poor for absolute pro-poorness. In the
growth terminology of Duclos (2009) and Araar, Duclos, Audet, and Makdissi
(2007), relative pro-poorness is checked by comparing P (z) using F1((1 + g)y)
for a posterior distribution F1(y) to P (z) for an initial distribution F0(y), using a
relative “norm” g (to be discussed later). Absolute pro-poorness with an absolute
norm a (also discussed below) is checked by comparing P (z) using F1(y+a) for
a posterior distribution F1(y) to P (z) for an initial distribution F0(y). Formally:
Deﬁnition 1 A movement from an initial distribution F0 to a posterior distribu-
tion F1 is judged relatively pro-poor by an index P (z) if
Z 1
0
p(y;z)dF1 ((1 + g)y) ¡
Z 1
0
p(y;z)dF0 (y) < 0: (6)
5Deﬁnition 2 A movement from an initial distribution F0 to a posterior distribu-
tion F1 is judged absolutely pro-poor by an index P (z) if
Z 1
0
p(y;z)dF1 (y + a) ¡
Z 1
0
p(y;z)dF0 (y) < 0: (7)
For the purposes of this paper, we will assume that the relative norm g is set
to the growth rate of average real income,4 and that the absolute norm a is set to














, ´ 2 fA;Rg: (10)
We now wish to determine how y¤R and y¤A vary with a marginal variation in
ti. As noted by Duclos, Makdissi, and Wodon (2008), the average impact of dti on
real income in the total population is given by dti times the average consumption




xi (y;q)dF (y): (11)
Usingthis, theproportionalchangeinaveragerealincome(followingachange







ydF(y) is average income. The absolute change in average real
income is given by
¡Xi (q)dti: (13)
4This is consistent with the view of Kakwani and Pernia (2000) (p.3) that “promoting pro-poor
growth requires a strategy that is deliberately biased in favor of the poor so that the poor beneﬁt
proportionately more than the rich.”
5Generalizations of this to other settings would not be difﬁcult, by setting for instance g to
growth in some quantiles (such as the median), or by setting a to 0 (which would be equivalent
to arguing that a change is pro-poor if it increases the poor’s absolute living standards — e.g.,
Ravallion and Chen 2003).
6In order to determine the impact of a marginal variation in ti on y¤R and y¤A,
we must subtract from the gross impact on real income given by (4) the impact on
real income of the change in the pro-poor norm given by (8) and (9). This leads to
@y¤R
@ti







= ¡xi (y;q) + Xi(q): (15)















(1) (y;z)[xi (y;q) ¡ Xi(q)]: (17)
To obtain the impact on total poverty, we integrate (16) and (17) over the entire





















(1) (y;z)[xi (y;q) ¡ Xi(q)]dF (y): (19)
We can now introduce pro-poor consumption dominance curves (CD
´:s), ´ 2


















i (y)dy for s ¸ 2;
(20)

















i (y)dy for s ¸ 2:
(21)
































This leads to our ﬁrst main analytical result.
Theorem 1 A marginal decrease in the tax on good i is ´-pro-poor (´ 2 fA;Rg)
for all indices P (z) 2 ¦s (z) and for all poverty lines z 2 [0;z+] if and only if
CD
´:s





It is useful to interpret Theorem 1 in the context of the ﬁrst two scenarios
listed at the beginning of Section 2.2 on page 4. For this, let us ﬁrst classify goods
according to their income elasticity, "
y
i.
Deﬁnition 3 A good i is said to be an inferior good if "
y
i < 0 and a normal good
if "
y
i > 0, for all y.
Deﬁnition 4 A normal good is said to be a necessary good if "
y
i < 1 and a luxury
good if "
y
i > 1, for all y.
Four simple remarks can then be made as a corollary to Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 Regardless of the value of s and z+:
1. a reduction (an increase) in the tax of good i is never (always) A-pro-poor
if the good is a normal good;
82. a reduction (an increase) in the tax of good i is always (never) A-pro-poor
if the good is an inferior good;
3. a reduction (an increase) in the tax of good i is never (always) R-pro-poor
if the good is a luxury good;
4. a reduction (an increase) in the tax of good i is always (never) R-pro-poor
if the good is a necessity.
The income elasticities "
y
i do not of course have to be uniformly negative,
positive, or below or above 1 for all values of y. When elasticities are not so
uniformly distributed, condition (24) will have to be checked on a case-by-case
distributional basis.
The above results are also useful only in the cases in which only one tax or
one price is changed, if for instance the government does not necessarily want to
keep its overall revenue unchanged. For the case of a revenue-neutral tax reform
scenario, one must ﬁnance a marginal tax reduction for a good i by a marginal
increase in the tax on a good j in order to keep overall tax revenue constant. To
show how to do this, suppose that there are K consumption goods and denote by














































Wildasin (1984) describes ° as the efﬁciency cost ratio of obtaining one dollar of
public funds by taxing good j to subsidize good i. We can now state our second
main result.
9Theorem 2 A marginal tax reduction on good i ﬁnanced by a marginal increase
in the tax on good j is ´-pro-poor (´ 2 fA;Rg) for all indices P (z) 2 ¦s (z) and
for all poverty lines z 2 [0;z+] if and only if
CD
´:s
i (z) ¡ °CD
´:s





The proof follows directly from that of Theorem 1.
Yitzhaki and Thirsk (1990) and Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991) ﬁnd that if ° is
superior to one, it is impossible to secure a second-order welfare dominant tax
reform due to the efﬁciency loss incurred. Makdissi and Wodon (2002) note,
however, that from a poverty perspective, it is possible to have a reform that is
dominant at all orders of stochastic dominance even when ° is greater than one,
so long as that part of the burden is supported by the non poor.
This is also true here in the context of R and A pro-poorness. In (28), it is the
weighted difference between CD
´:s
i (y) ¡ °CD
´:s
j (y) that matters. A tax reform
can be economically inefﬁcient (with ° > 1) and still be considered to be pro-poor
if CD
´:s
j (y) is not too large compared to CD
´:s
i (y).
When s = 1 and when ° = 1 (when there is no efﬁciency beneﬁt or cost
to the tax reform), a tax reform is absolutely pro-poor if the poor’s share of the
total consumption of good i exceeds their share of the total consumption of good
j. Exactly the same interpretation applies to the relative pro-poorness of a tax
reform when ° = 1: the poor’s share of the total consumption of good i must
exceed their share of the total consumption of good j. This is because mean real
income is unaffected by a revenue-neutral tax reform when ° = 1.7
When ° 6= 1, the interpretation of A and R pro-poorness differs. Take ° > 1,
a case in which average real income falls after the tax reform (because of the
efﬁciency cost). Relative pro-poorness demands that the share of the poor in total
real income does not fall after the reform. Absolute pro-poorness demands that
the absolute real income of the poor does not fall after the reform by more than
the absolute fall in total real income. Since the initial share of the poor in total
income is less than one (y=¹ is less than one in (22)), an economically inefﬁcient
reform will be more likely to be absolutely pro-poor than relatively pro-poor.
The reverse reasoning applies to the case of an economically efﬁcient tax re-
form, for which ° < 1 and average real income increases. Relative pro-poorness
demands that the share of the poor in total real income increases after the reform,
and absolute pro-poorness will require that the absolute real income of the poor
7When ° = 1, we have g = a = 0 since Xjdtj + Xidti=0.
10increases by more than total real income after the reform. Because of this, an
economically efﬁcient reform will be more likely to be relatively pro-poor than
absolutely pro-poor.
If ° < 1, a reform will also be more likely to be considered relatively pro-
poor than absolutely pro-poor as s increases. The converse holds if ° > 1. This
is because the greater the value of s, the greater the importance given to the poor-
est of the poor in assessing pro-poorness conditions. (20) and (21) show that the
standard in assessing relative pro-poorness is the difference between shares in the
consumption of a good and shares in total income, but that the standard in assess-
ing absolute pro-poorness is the difference between shares in the consumption of
a good and 1. For the poor, that difference for relative pro-poorness will be larger
than for absolute pro-poorness. Since an increase in s increases the importance
given to the poorer individuals, ceteris paribus, an increase in s will also lead
more quickly to the validation of (28) for ´ = R than for ´ = A if ° < 1, and
more quickly to the validation of (28) for ´ = A than for ´ = R if ° > 1. If ° = 1
this difference vanishes as the conditions for relative or absolute pro-poorness of
tax reforms become both equivalent to the condition that a tax reform reduces
poverty (see Duclos, Makdissi, and Wodon 2008).
3 Estimation and inference
To be able to implement empirically the above tools, we ought to consider
the estimation and the sampling distribution of the curves needed to test for pro-
poorness. For this, we suppose for expositional simplicity that we dispose of
a sample of N independently and identically distributed observations,8 and that
the pre-reform income and consumption of goods j and l for observation i (i =
1;:::;N) are denoted by yi; xi
j and xi
l, respectively. Ignoring the constant 1
(s¡2)!,
the CD























8The analytical results can be extended to account for complex multi-stage sampling designs.
Taking into sampling design is indeed done in the Mexican illustration below, using analytical


























k is an estimator of average consumption
of good k, and b ¹ = 1
N
PN








0 xk(y;q)(z ¡ y)







k (z ¡ yi)
s¡2
+ . The asymp-
totic sampling distribution of d CD
s
(xk;z) for s ¸ 2 is given in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3 Let the second population moment of xk(y;µ)(z ¡ y)
s¡2
+ be ﬁnite.







is asymptotically normal with
















¢2 dF(y) ¡ CD
s(xk;z)
2: (31)
Prof: See the appendix.
The asymptotic distribution of d CD
R:s
k (z) and d CD
A:s
k (z) can be obtained by
noting that (29) and (30) are functions of d CD
s
(xk;z), b Xk, d CD
s
(y;z), b ¹, and
d CD
s
(1;z). The sampling distribution d CD
s
(y;z) and d CD
s
(1;z) can be obtained
as special cases of Theorem 3. b ¹ and b Xk are simple sums of independently and
identically distributed random variables. Using the “delta method” of Rao (1973),
the sampling distribution of d CD
A:s
k (z) and d CD
R:s
k (z) can then be obtained by a
linear transformation of the covariance matrix of d CD
s






For s = 1, we need an estimator of xk (z;q), the expected consumption of
good k at z, times f(z). For this, we can use a non-parametric estimation proce-








·h (z ¡ yi)x
i
k; (32)





0 (for symmetry), and
R
u2·(u)du = c·. In the illustration below, we choose a






but other kernel functional forms could also be used. In the illustration, we choose
h using the cross-validation method, which is asymptotically optimal (see H¨ ardle
1990, Theorem 5.1.1) and we also a locally linear estimator to avoid biases at
the lower bound of expenditures. Theorem 4 then gives the asymptotic sampling
distribution of d CD
1
(xk;z):
Theorem 4 Let i)
R
·(u)
2 du exists, ii) h » N¡0:2, iii) CD
1
k (y) be twice differ-










withmean0andlimitingvarianceVk(z), whereBk(z) = 0:5c·@2CD
1(xk;z)=(@z)2




Prof: See the appendix.
The sampling distribution of d CD
R:1
k (z) and d CD
A:1
k (z) can then be obtained
by a linear transformation of the covariance matrix of d CD
1
(xk;z), b Xk and b ¹
using the delta method. As for s ¸ 2, the terms needed to carry out statis-
tical inference are either constants (c· and
R
·(u)
2 du) or can be readily esti-






¢2 dF(y), d CD
s
(xk;z)2, @2CD
1(xk;z)=(@z)2, f(z) and ck(z)).
Note, however, that it is usual to consider (and to ﬁnd) the bias terms Bk(z) and
Bk(z)=Xk to be of negligible practical importance9, and we also make this as-
sumption in the illustration below.
4 An application to Mexico’s indirect tax system
4.1 Mexican data
We now brieﬂy apply the above methodology to Mexico’s indirect tax system.
The data used for our application comes from the National Income and Expendi-
9This is particularly true in the study of consumption data, where the second order derivative
of expected consumption at z, @2CD
1(xk;z)=(@z)2, may be expected to be small. For more on
this, see for instance H¨ ardle (1990), p.101.
13ture (ENIGH) Survey collected in 2004, which is nationally representative of the
Mexican population. ENIGH surveys collect information on incomes and expen-
ditures, goods and services used for self-consumption, as well as socio-economic
characteristics and labor market activities of all household members.
AsiscommoninLatinAmerica, weusetotalincomepercapitaasthemeasure
of living standards for all members of a household. To correct for spatial variation
in prices, we assess all incomes in reference to rural prices and multiply urban
household incomes by the ratio of rural to urban poverty lines. We use as a guide
a 2004 rural poverty line set to 550 pesos per month per capita. To simplify the
interpretation of ﬁgures and the discussion, we normalize income by that rural
poverty line so that a household with an income equal to one is at the level of the
rural poverty line and a household with an income of 2 has a real income equal
to twice that line. We weight households by the product of household size and
household sampling weight; this is equivalent to formulating our estimators on
the basis of the population of individual living standards.
We consider indirect tax reforms affecting four broad classes of goods and
services (food, energy, transport and other goods) as well as various foodstuffs.10
Table 1 presents the percentage of total expenditure allocated to goods and ser-
vices by quintile. As expected, the share of total expenditures on food items
decreases from the poorest to the richest quintile. Conversely, the share of to-
tal expenditures on transportation and other goods increases with quintiles. Table
1 also shows that the composition of the food basket varies with income quintiles;
households in the poorest income quintile spend a greater share of their total food
expenditure on cereals (25.88%) and on vegetables (19.30%) than those in the
richest quintile — who spend relatively more (46.44%) on protein-intensive foods
(milk, meat and ﬁsh).
4.2 Impact of tax changes
Figure 1 presents relative dominance curves CD
R:s(z) for three broad classes
of goods and services and for s = 1;2, along with two-sided 90% conﬁdence in-
tervals. UsingtheresultsofTheorem1, thisshowsthatamarginaltaxreductionon
Food or on Energy would be relatively pro-poor, and that this conclusion would be
valid for any relative pro-poor judgements based on indices P 2 ¦1(z) (namely,
those that in agreement with the Pen principle) for a wide range of poverty lines
10In 2004, all foodstuffs were exempt of value-added taxes (VAT) in Mexico. A few of these
goods were subsidized, however.
14reaching almost 3. For s = 2, this is true for all possible poverty lines. Con-
versely, a marginal increase in the tax on any of these two classes of goods would
be considered relatively “anti-poor”. This suggests that it is important to consider
the use to which increases in tax revenues are put to know whether a tax reform is
globally pro-poor or not. We return to this below.
Figure 2 presents the corresponding absolute dominance curves CD
A:s(z) for
three broad classes of goods and services. A marginal reduction in taxes on any
of the different goods could not be considered to be absolutely pro-poor. As in-
dicated in Corollary 1, this result is not surprising considering the fact that the
absolute pro-poor requirements are typically more demanding (since most goods
are normal goods) than the relative ones (since not all normal goods are luxury
goods) in the case of tax decreases. Conversely, increases in taxes on any of the
different goods will be absolutely pro-poor for all P 2 ¦1(z) for a large range of
poverty lines and for all P 2 ¦2(z) for all poverty lines.11
4.3 Impact of efﬁciency-neutral tax reforms
We now turn to the pro-poorness of revenue-neutral tax reforms. We ﬁrst as-
sume that the tax reforms are efﬁciency neutral, viz, that ° = 1. Recall from page
11 that with ° = 1 the tests for absolute and relative pro-poorness are equivalent.
4.3.1 Efﬁciency-neutral reforms involving broad classes of goods
Figure 3 presents the difference between the absolute pro-poor consumption
dominance curves of Food and Transport, and this, for ﬁrst and second orders of
dominance. Except for rather low poverty lines, the lower bound of the conﬁdence
interval of this difference is always greater than zero, and hence a revenue-neutral
tax reform that decreases food taxes and increases transportation taxes would be
considered absolutely and relatively pro-poor for all P 2 ¦1(z) for a range of
poverty lines extending to about 3, and for all P 2 ¦2(z) for all poverty lines,
except again for a bottom range of relatively small poverty lines.
Figure 4 presents a similar difference, but this time between Food and Energy.
For s = 1, the lower bound of the conﬁdence interval is greater than zero only up
11Theoretically speaking, the dominance tests carried out in Section 4 must be applied over
ranges varying between 0 and some z+. Statistically speaking, however, there is a general
“information-less” problem in the tails of distributions that impedes such testing for values of z
close to 0. Hence, statistically speaking, we must restrict the tests to a range that is lower-bounded
somewhere above 0. See Davidson and Duclos (2006) for a discussion of this.
15to about the ofﬁcial poverty line. Given this degree of statistical insigniﬁcance, it
is therefore not immediate that one should consider as ﬁrst-order pro-poor a rev-
enue and efﬁciency neutral tax reform that decreases food taxation and increases
energy taxation — or indeed the reverse. The concern is alleviated if we move to
s = 2: the lower bound of the conﬁdence interval is greater than zero after around
z = 0:4 and up to almost 3.
Such tests of the effect of revenue and efﬁciency neutral tax reforms can be
performed on every pair of goods. Table 2 summarizes the test results for the pairs
of the three main goods. Here are some of the main ﬁndings.
² A tax reform that were to increase taxation on Transport and decrease tax-
ation on Food would be absolutely and relatively ﬁrst-order pro-poor over a
wide range of poverty lines (0.145-3 for the estimates, 0.190-2.971 for the
statistically signiﬁcant range).12
² A tax reform that were to increase taxation on Transport and decrease tax-
ation on Energy would also be absolutely and relatively ﬁrst-order pro-poor
over a wide range of poverty lines (0.137-3 for the estimates, 0.211-2.953
for the statistically signiﬁcant range).
² Applyingstatisticalinferencetechniquescanalterconclusionssubstantially.
For instance, the estimates of Table 2 suggest that a tax reform that increases
taxes on Energy and that decreases taxes on Food is pro-poor over a wide
range of poverty lines (0.15 to 2.711). This is considerably shortened (0.206
to 0.925) when one focusses on the range over which the ranking of the
curves is statistically signiﬁcant.
² If a reform is ﬁrst-order pro-poor over a range of poverty lines that starts
at 0, then that range widens as we move to second-order pro-poorness —
see for instance the estimates shown in the ﬁrst column, where the range of
poverty lines over which a rise in Food taxes combined to a fall in Energy
taxes is pro-poor increases from 0-0.15 to 0-0.31 as we move from ﬁrst to
second-order dominance.
12Note that the poverty headcount at z = 0:145 is around 0.3%. Very little statistical informa-
tion is thus available below that value, an indication of the information-less problem mentioned in
footnote 11. It would also require a pro-poor judgement that would be almost strictly Rawlsian to
reverse the pro-poor judgements implied by the tests over 0.145-3 and 0.190-2.971.
16² This last result, however, is true only when the ranking is valid for a ﬁrst-
order range of poverty lines that right at 0. Table 2 shows alternative in-
stances of interesting relationships between the ranges over which ﬁrst-
order and second-order dominance hold. For instance, an increase in Energy
taxes and a fall in Food taxes (third column) is statistically ﬁrst-order pro-
poor over a range 0.206-0.925 of poverty lines; that range becomes 0.383-
2.753 for second-order dominance. Increasing the order of dominance thus
reduces statistical signiﬁcance over the lower values of poverty lines (the
lower bound increases from 0.206 to 0.383), but it increases considerably
(from 0.925 to 2.753) the upper bound of poverty lines over which the rank-
ing of the curves is statistically signiﬁcant.
4.3.2 Efﬁciency-neutral reforms involving foodstuffs
Let us now turn to the pro-poorness of revenue and efﬁciency neutral tax re-
forms involving solely food items. Figure 5 shows for instance the difference
between the pro-poor consumption dominance curve of Cereals and that of Veg-
etables for ﬁrst and second orders. The results are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Moreover, and as discussed above, when a reform is not statistically pro-poor
within a range of poverty lines that starts at 0, the statistically insigniﬁcant range
can tend to widen as s is increased. This can be seen in Figure 5 by noting that
the area over which the conﬁdence intervals overlap with the 0 line is pushed up
and is wider with second-order than with ﬁrst-order dominance.
The pro-poorness results involving the pairs of the three main food items are
summarized in Table 3. They indicate that increasing Mexican taxes on Milk, meat
andﬁshtodecreasetaxesonCerealsand/oronVegetableswouldbepro-poor, both
in terms of normative robustness and in terms of statistical signiﬁcance, and this,
whether we consider ﬁrst or second-order dominance. The results of Table 3 also
show that reforms involving any other combination of food items would not be so
robustly pro-poor.
4.4 Impact of efﬁciency non-neutral tax reforms
We have assumed until now that tax reforms would be efﬁciency neutral. This
assumes that the marginal deadweight loss of indirect taxation per dollar of tax
raised is the same across all commodities. This is unlikely to hold since it im-
plicitly assumes that compensated price elasticities are the same across all of the
goods involved in the reform.
17To allow for efﬁciency non-neutral tax reforms, assume to start with that ° = 2
— that is, that tax reforms are inefﬁcient to the extent that each per capita dollar
of tax raised on good j to ﬁnance a tax decrease on good i (see (28)) decreases per
capitawelfareby1(namely, by°-1)dollar. Figure6showsthedifferencebetween
the ﬁrst-order absolute and relative pro-poor consumption dominance curves of
Food and of Energy, when the dominance curve for Energy is weighted by ° = 2.
Setting ° = 2 in that way implicitly supposes that the compensated price elasticity
for Food is lower than that for Energy, and that the marginal deadweight loss from
taxing Energy is thus greater than that from taxing Food.
Recall from Figure 4 that the difference between the ﬁrst-order pro-poor con-
sumption dominance curves of Food and of Energy was statistically positive only
over a small range of poverty lines when ° was set to 1. With ° = 2, Figure 6
shows that the difference in the absolute curves is now nowhere positive. It is even
in fact negative between around 0.7 and 2.2, which means that it would now be
relatively pro-poor over that range of poverty lines to decrease Energy taxes and
increase Food taxes.
The more inefﬁcient it is to tax a good, the greater the tax rate that must be
levied on that good to generate the tax revenues needed to decrease taxes on an-
other, less price-elastic, good. If the more price-elastic good is not a luxury good,
this makes the poor lose proportionately more from an inefﬁcient tax reform than
under an efﬁciency-neutral tax reform. This also makes increasing the price of
the more price-elastic good less likely to be relatively pro-poor. Only when the
price-elastic good is also a luxury good will an increase in its tax be conducive to
greater relative pro-poorness. Since Energy is not a luxury good in Mexico, the
greater the deadweight loss associated to taxing Energy, the more relatively pro-
poor it will be to tax Food instead. This is true even though, as shown on Figure
1, Food may be less income elastic than Energy in Mexico.
Figure6alsoshowsthat thedifferencein the absoluteconsumption dominance
curves is now everywhere positive, which also means that it is now absolutely pro-
poor to tax Energy to ﬁnance a tax decrease on Food. The reverse also holds: it
would absolutely anti-poor to ﬁnance a tax decrease on Energy by raising taxes
on Food. This is in sharp contrast to the above results for relative pro-poorness. If
the price elastic good is a normal good, the distance between the absolute loss of
the rich and that of the poor for ° > 1 will be even more considerable than with
an efﬁciency-neutral tax reform. Absolute pro-poorness of increasing taxes on the
more price-elastic good is then also more likely to hold in that context.
A similar exercise is repeated in Figure 7, which shows the difference between
the ﬁrst-order relative and absolute pro-poor consumption dominance curve for
18Cereals and that for Vegetables. The curve for Vegetables (presumably the more
price-elastic good) is being weighted by ° = 2. This can be compared to Figure
5 in which ° = 1. With ° = 2, it now possible to declare that a revenue-neutral
reform that increases taxes on Cereals and decreases them on Vegetables is ﬁrst-
order relatively pro-poor. The reasoning is the same as before: Vegetables are not
a luxury good, and it is thus better not to raise taxes on that price-elastic good. But
a revenue-neutral reform that decreases taxes on Cereals and increases them on
Vegetables would be ﬁrst-order absolutely pro-poor over a wide range of poverty
lines, again because, for ° > 1, that would maximize the distance between the
absolute loss of the rich and that of the poor.
4.5 Trading off efﬁciency and distribution
The trade-off between efﬁciency (which is related to price elasticities) and the
shape of the CD curves (which is related to income elasticities) can be usefully
exempliﬁed by the following ratio ±
´:s











Using (28) and supposing that CD
´:s
j (z) > 0, we then ﬁnd that a revenue-neutral
tax reform that reduces taxation on good i and increases taxation on good j is
´-pro-poor (´ 2 fA;Rg) if and only if
±
´:s





where °i;j is the efﬁciency cost of taxing good j relative to good i. If CD
´:s
j (z) <
0, then the condition is rather that
±
´:s







j (z) > 0, condition (35) shows that we can interpret ±
´:s
i;j (z) as
those critical efﬁciency ratios that must not be exceeded by °i;j for a tax reform
that reduces taxation on good i (and increases taxation on good j) to be declared
pro-poor. A reverse use of ±
´:s
i;j (z) can also be made: we can interpret ±
´:s
i;j (z) as
the critical efﬁciency ratios that must be surpassed by °i;j for a tax reform that
reduces taxation on good j (and increases taxation on good i) to be declared pro-
poor. When CD
´:s
j (z) < 0, condition (36) shows that we can interpret ±
´:s
i;j (z) as
critical efﬁciency ratios that must be exceeded by °i;j for a tax reform that reduces
taxation on good i (and increases taxation on good j) to be declared pro-poor.
19Figure 8 shows the ±´:s(z) curves for a reform involving Food and Energy.
Let us set an upper bound z+ = 2 to the range of poverty lines. Consider ﬁrst
the absolute pro-poorness of a revenue-neutral reform that decreases taxation on
Food and increases taxation on Energy. Since CD
A:s
Energy(z) < 0 (see Figure 2),
for such a reform to be absolutely pro-poor according to Figure 8, the efﬁciency
cost °i;j of taxing energy relative to food must be larger than 1.7. This statistic
is given by the maximal height of the upper bound of the conﬁdence intervals
shown in Figure 8. At that maximal height, °i;j is indeed statistically greater than
±
´:s
i;j (z), and condition (36) is therefore statistically veriﬁed. With °i;j larger than
1.7, the absolute fall in average real income will always be larger than the fall in
the poor’s real income, no matter what value of z below 2 is selected. This is
because a °i;j larger than 1.7 will always involve a sufﬁciently large increase in
the tax on Energy to compensate for the effect of the fall in Food taxation.
Consider then a revenue-neutral reform that increases taxation on food and
decreases taxation on energy, for the same upper bound of z+ = 2. For such a
reform to be absolutely pro-poor according to Figure 8, the efﬁciency cost °i;j of
taxing energy relative to food must be lower than 0.79. This statistic is now given
by the minimal height of the lower bound of the conﬁdence intervals, for reasons
that are the reverse of those just mentioned.
A similar exercise can be carried out for relative pro-poorness, but with quite
different results. Since we now have that CD
R:s
Energy(z) > 0 (see Figure 1), the
condition to check is (35). A revenue-neutral reform that decreases taxation on
Food and increases taxation on Energy will be relatively pro-poor according to
Figure 8 if the efﬁciency cost °i;j of taxing energy relative to food is lower than
around 0.5. Conversely, a revenue-neutral reform that increases taxation on Food
and decreases taxation on Energy will be relatively pro-poor if the efﬁciency cost
°i;j of taxing energy relative to food is greater than 4.5. When 0:5 · °i;j · 4:5,
the effect on relative pro-poorness of a tax reform involving Food and Energy is
either statistically insigniﬁcant or normatively sensitive to the choice of indices
and poverty lines between 0 and 2.
5 Conclusion
This paper develops a methodology for checking wether indirect tax reforms
can be considered to be pro-poor or not. The methodology extends previous
stochastic dominance techniques and enables one to characterize tax reforms on
the basis of wide spectra of possible views of “pro-poorness”. This is done for
20both absolute and relative pro-poorness, for ranges of possible poverty lines, and
for different degrees of distributional sensitivity to the differentiated impact of tax
reforms across pre-reform values of welfare. Statistical inference techniques are
also provided to make these tools empirically applicable.
The methodology is applied to the pro-poorness of possible reforms of Mex-
ico’s indirect tax system, both across broad classes of goods and across foodstuffs.
This leads to the characterizations of a number of possible pro-poor indirect tax
reforms. The results also show that whether indirect tax reforms can be deemed to
be pro-poor can depend to an important extent on the type of distributional and/or
pro-poor views that are applied to the analysis, and that it is therefore important
to make such views clear when making policy recommendations for pro-poor tax
reforms. The results further indicate that whether indirect tax reforms are pro-
poor depends 1) on whether government revenue neutrality is maintained, and 2)
on the size of the deadweight gains/losses incurred in the trade-off between bal-
ancing efﬁciency and redistribution.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Theorem 1
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We know that CD
´:2
i (0) = 0 and that p1 (1;z) = 0. The ﬁrst term on the r.h.s.




















































i (0) = 0 and p(s¡1) (1;z) = 0 is implied by the deﬁnition of 1 and by (2).














Equation (39) obeys the relation depicted in (40). We have shown that if (40) is
true then equation (42) is also true. This implies that equation (42) is true for all











This last equation together with equation (2) proves the sufﬁciency of the condi-
tion.
In order to establish necessity, consider the set of functions p(y;z) for which







s¡1 ² y · y
(¡1)
s¡1 (y + ² ¡ y) y < y · y + ²
0 y > y + ²:
(44)
Povertyindiceswhosefunctionp(y;z)hastheparticularaboveformforp(s¡1) (y;z)






0 y < y
(¡1)
s y < y < y + ²
0 y > y + ²:
(45)
Imagine now that CD
´:s
i (y) < 0 on an interval [y;y + ²] for y < z+ and for ²
that can be arbitrarily close to 0. For p(y;z) deﬁned as in (44), expression (43) is
then positive and the marginal tax reform induces a marginal increase of poverty.
Hence, it cannot be that CD
´:s
i (y) < 0 for y 2 [y;y + ²] when y < z+. This
proves the necessity of the condition.
226.2 Proof of Theorem 3
d CD
s
(xk;z) is a consistent estimator of CD
s(xk;z) by the existence of the ﬁrst
population moment of xk(y)(z ¡ y)
s¡2
+ and the law of large numbers. d CD
s
(xk;z)
is N0:5 consistent and asymptotically normal by the existence of the second pop-
ulation moment and the central limit theorem, with asymptotic variance given by
31 by simple calculation.
6.3 Proof of Theorem 4
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100(xk;z)c·.
By (32), note that d CD
1
(xk;z) is a sum of iid variables to which we may apply
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where the last expression is obtained by substituting u for h¡1(z ¡ y). For small


























































2 du = Vk(z);
which concludes the proof.
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Table 1: Shares (by population quintiles) of total expenditures on different goods
and services
Expenditure shares in %
Quintile Poorest 2 3 4 Richest
Goods and services
Food 42.99 28.88 22.61 17.20 8.04
Energy 6.13 5.09 4.45 3.87 2.64
Transport 11.74 11.90 12.09 13.32 12.42
Other goods 39.14 54.13 60.85 65.61 76.9
Shares of food expenditures
Cereals 25.88 23.91 21.20 18.95 15.90
Milk, meat and ﬁsh 28.66 37.92 41.90 45.61 46.44
Vegetables 19.30 18.30 17.63 17.86 17.66
Other food items 26.16 19.87 19.27 17.58 20.00
27Table 2: Intervals of poverty lines over which a revenue and efﬁciency neutral
tax reform that decreases taxes on row goods and that increases taxes on column
goods can be considered pro-poor (absolutely and relatively speaking)
First-order dominance
Goods Food Transport Energy
Food — 0.145-3.000+ 0.150-2.711
— (0.190-2.971) (0.206-0.925)
Transport 0.000-0.145 — 0.000-0.137
— —
Energy 0.000-0.150 0.137-3.000+ —
(0.211-2.953) —
Second-order dominance
Goods Food Transport Energy
Food — 0.279-3.000+ 0.310-3.000+
— (0.375-3.000+) (0.383-2.753)
Transport 0.000-0.279 – 0.000-0.269
— — —
Energy 0.000-0.310 0.269-3.000+ —
— (0.458-3.000+) —
Note: The intervals that appear on the ﬁrst line of each cell are estimates. The intervals over which
the results are statistically signiﬁcant at a 95% level are shown within parentheses on the second
line of each cell.
28Table 3: Intervals of poverty lines over which a revenue and efﬁciency neutral
tax reform that decreases taxes on row goods and that increases taxes on column
goods can be considered pro-poor
First-order dominance (s = 1)
Goods Cereals Milk, Meat and Fish Vegetables
Cereals — 0.000-2.231 0.000-0.171
— (0.010-2.159) (0.000-0.107)
Milk, Meat and Fish 2.231-3.000+ — 0.010-0.012
(2.294-3.000+) — —
Vegetables 0.171-0.588 0.012-2.421 —
( 0.271-0.458) ( 0.044-2.040) —
Second-order dominance (s = 2)
Goods Cereals Milk, Meat and Fish Vegetables
Cereals — 0.000-3.000+ 0.000-0.328
— (0.219-3.000+) —
Milk, Meat and Fish — — 0.067-0.112
— — —
Vegetables 0.328-0.701 0.067-3.000+ —
— (0.196-3.000+) —
Note: The intervals that appear on the ﬁrst line of each cell are estimates. The intervals over which
the results are statistically signiﬁcant at a 95% level are shown within parentheses on the second
line of each cell.
29Figure 1: 90 % two-sided conﬁdence intervals around relative pro-poor consumption
dominance curves, CDR:s(z)
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Figure 2: 90 % two-sided conﬁdence intervals around absolute pro-poor consumption
dominance curves, CDA:s(z)
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30Figure 3: Difference between absolute pro-poor consumption dominance curves
CDA:s=1
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Figure 4: Difference between absolute pro-poor consumption dominance curves
CDA:s=1
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Figure 6: Difference between pro-poor consumption dominance curves, assuming that
the deadweight loss from taxing Energy is twice as large as that from taxing Food
Relative pro-poorness
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32Figure 7: Difference between pro-poor consumption dominance curves, assuming that



















0 .6 1.2 1.8 2.4 3
Income (z): 1 equals the official poverty line
Difference
Lower bound of 95% confidence interval














0 .6 1.2 1.8 2.4 3
Income (z): 1 equals the official poverty line
Difference
Lower bound of 95% confidence interval
Upper bound of 95% confidence interval








0 .4 .8 1.2 1.6 2
Income (z): 1 equals to the poverty line
Difference
Lower bound of 95% confidence interval


















0 .4 .8 1.2 1.6 2
Income (z): 1 equals to the poverty line
Difference
Lower bound of 95% confidence interval
Upper bound of 95% confidence interval
33